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Justice Brennan and the Death Penalty
Ronald J. Tabakt
I. The Fallacy of the Assertion that the Death Penalty Is
Necessarily Constitutional
Justice Brennan first articulated his jurisprudence on the
death penalty in detail in 1972. In Furman v. Georgia,' the
United States Supreme Court, held unconstitutional the death
sentences of all 558 people then on death row.2 Justice Bren-
nan's concurring opinion in Furman set forth three principal ba-
ses for his conclusion that the death penalty was unconstitu-
tional under the eighth amendment.3 Two of them, I have
understood for a long time. The third, I did not fully understand
until very recently.
The first aspect of Justice Brennan's Furman opinion which
I will cover is his counter to the assertion that because the death
penalty is mentioned in the Bill of Rights, it is obviously consti-
tutional.4 Justice Brennan pointed out that the framers of the
Bill of Rights, in merely mentioning the death penalty, did not
necessarily intend to sanction its use.6 In the fifth amendment,
the framers merely provided that if we do have the death pen-
alty, which "was then a common punishment," then "a person
charged with that crime is entitled"' to due process of law.7
Although the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and
t Special Counsel, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; B.A. 1971, Yale Univer-
sity; J.D. 1974, Harvard University. Mr. Tabak is also Chairman of New York Lawyers
Against the Death Penalty and the recipient of the Outstanding Volunteer Award of The
Legal Aid Society, 1984, the New York State Bar Association President's Pro Bono Ser-
vice Award, 1985 and the American Lawyer's Best Pro Bono Performance Award, 1986.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. See Marquart & Sorensen, From Death Row to Prison Society: A National Study
of the Furman-Commuted Inmates, 23 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 5 (1989).
3. Furman, 408 U.S. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 282-84.
5. Id. at 283-84.
6. Id. at 283.
7. Id. n.27 (quoting fifth amendment).
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unusual punishment does not say whether death is or is not
cruel or unusual, the definition of what is "cruel and unusual" is,
as Justice Brennan emphasized, "not static."8 If the definition of
what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment consisted only of
those things which were considered cruel and unusual when the
English stopped ruling our country, the eighth amendment's
"general principles would have little value and [would] be con-
verted by precedent into lifeless formulas."9 Indeed, since, at the
time of the eighth amendment's submission to Congress, it was
understood "potentially to bar - not approve - capital pun-
ishment," 10 Justice Brennan has concluded that those who seek
to justify the death penalty's constitutionality by reference to
the framers' intent are exhibiting "arrogance cloaked as
humility.""
Justice Brennan also rejected the assertion that the wisdom
of state-enforced killings is a matter for legislative determina-
tion and thus cannot violate the eighth amendment. Instead, as
the Supreme Court recognized in the 1940's, "the right to be free
of cruel and unusual punishments like the other guarantees of
the Bill of Rights, may not be submitted to vote; [it depend[s]
on the outcome of no election.... The very purpose of a Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy.., and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts.""
II. The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death
Penalty
Justice Brennan recognized in his Furman concurrence that
there is a substantial likelihood that the death penalty will not
be carried out in any given case."3 Given all the people who com-
mit murders, very few wind up on death row, and even fewer get
8. Id. at 269 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
9. Id. (quoting Welms v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
10. See id., at 262-63; Brennan, The 1986 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Lecture: Con-
stitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View From the Court, 100 HARv. L.
Rav. 313 (1986).
11. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
Georgetown U. Text and Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985).
12. Id. at 268-69 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
13. Id. at 291-93.
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executed. In view of the many discretionary elements which de-
termine who ends up being executed, "the conclusion is virtually
inescapable that [capital punishment] is being inflicted arbitrar-
ily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery."'"
Justice Brennan maintained that if, under these circum-
stances, a significantly less severe punishment exists that is ade-
quate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment of
death is purportedly inflicted, the death penalty is excessive
within the meaning of the eighth amendment."'
Justice Brennan concluded that long-term imprisonment is
an alternative which achieves all legitimate purposes of capital
punishment. As Justice Brennan explained, there is no reason to
believe that the death penalty - as opposed to long-term im-
prisonment - deters crime by people who have yet to commit a
crime, or is likely to prevent people who have committed murder
from committing another murder while they are in prison. 6
Four years after Furman, the Supreme Court upheld new
death sentence laws in Gregg v. Georgia,'7 Proffitt v. Florida,8
and in Jurek v. Texas. 9 Justice Brennan's dissent in Gregg
(which applied also to Profitt and Jurek), pointed out that the
plurality opinion which was crucial in the upholding of these
death penalty laws did not focus "on the essence of the death
penalty itself, but primarily on the procedures" employed by the
states.2 0 According to the plurality, these procedures were suffi-
cient to guard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of
the death penalty.21 However, the actual operation of these and
other death penalty statutes has turned out to be extremely ar-
bitrary and capricious, in numerous respects.
A major source of arbitrariness and capriciousness is the
provision of counsel to indigent people in capital cases. Justice
Brennan dissented in several cases such as Burger v. Kemp 22 in
14. Id. at 293.
15. See id. at 303-05.
16. See id. at 300-04.
17. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
18. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
19. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
20. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227.
21. Id. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
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which the Court rejected, or failed to consider, claims that ap-
pointed counsel for poor people were ineffective in capital cases.
Perhaps the best discussion of the impact of the Court's dis-
position of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in capital
cases is the concurring opinion by two of the three Fifth Circuit
judges who upheld the death sentence in Riles v. McCotter."
They said that under the ineffective assistance standard im-
posed by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,4 a
prisoner on death row is only entitled to release if he shows not
only that his lawyer bungled, but also that the bungling likely
affected the result. Hence, "accused persons who are represented
by 'not-legally-ineffective' lawyers may be condemned to die
when the same accused, if represented by effective counsel,
would receive at least the clemency of a life sentence."2
Another source of arbitrariness and capriciousness is trial
judges' errors of constitutional dimension, in their charges to ju-
ries during the guilt/innocence phase of capital cases. Such con-
stitutional error occurred at the Georgia trial of Raymond
Franklin.26 Fortunately Franklin's constitutional claim was ulti-
mately upheld by the Supreme Court. The majority opinion, by
Justice Brennan, held that in a case in which intent to kill was
the key issue, it was unconstitutional for a judge to instruct the
jury that the defendant is presumed to have intended the killing
unless that presumption is rebutted.27 Mr. Franklin, whom i
represented before the Court, received a life sentence at his
retrial.
Justice Brennan vehemently objected to upholding death
sentences for people who neither kill nor intend to kill. The
leading case on the issue of how culpable and responsible a de-
fendant must be in order for the death sentence to be constitu-
tional is Tison v. Arizona.2 This case involved Ricky and Ray-
mond Tison, who helped their father and their father's friend
escape from prison, and subsequently steal a car.29 The two sons
23. 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., joined by Johnson, J., concurring).
24. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
25. Riles, 799 F.2d at 955 (emphasis in original).
26. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
27. Id. at 325.
28. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
29. Id. at 139-40.
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went off to get some water for the family whose car they had
stolen.30 In their absence, their father and his friend killed the
family. 1
The sons had not intended a killing, they had not partici-
pated in a killing, they had not contemplated a killing, and yet
they were given the death sentence.2 The Court held it was con-
stitutional for the sons to get the death sentence because they
supposedly showed extreme indifference to human life. 3
In his dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the fact that the
state was allowed to use, as an aggravating factor against the
sons, the heinous nature in which the murders were committed,
even though the sons were not even there at the time of the kill-
ings.3 4 Justice Brennan then attacked the Court's holding that it
is constitutional to impose the death penalty on someone who
neither killed nor intended to kill while committing a felony.3 5
As Justice Brennan stressed, "because the person has not chosen
to kill, his or her moral and criminal culpability is of a different
degree than that of one who killed or intended to kill."'3 6
In Justice Brennan's opinion, another example of capital
punishment's application to people lacking responsibility is the
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles who have reached
their sixteenth birthday. In 1989, in Stanford v. Kentucky,'7 the
United States Supreme Court held by a 5-4 vote that it is consti-
tutional to execute such juveniles. In his dissent, Justice Bren-
nan pointed out that over fifty countries have abolished the
death penalty or apply it only to cases of treason, that twenty-
seven other countries do not, in fact, impose capital punishment
and that most of the remaining countries prohibit the execution
of juveniles.3 8 Moreover, Justice Brennan noted that according
to Amnesty International, since 1979 only eight juveniles in the
entire world have been executed - three of them in the United
30. Id. at 140-41.
31. Id. at 141.
32. Id. at 150.
33. See id. at 158.
34. Id. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 163, 168-71.
36. Id. at 171.
37. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
38. Id. at 389 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1991]
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States.89
Justice Brennan's dissent in Stanford also pointed out that
"[l]egislative determinations distinguishing juveniles from
adults" abound in a whole variety of contexts, wherein people do
not have rights until they reach age eighteen. These statutes re-
veal much about how our society regards juveniles as a class, and
about societal beliefs regarding levels of responsibility.0 Justice
Brennan's conclusion was that "the same categorical assumption
that juveniles as a class are insufficiently mature to be regarded
as fully responsible that we make in so many other areas is ap-
propriately made in determining whether minors may be subject
to the death penalty.""'
Justice Brennan employed this same rationale against the
imposition of capital punishment for those who lack responsibil-
ity because of limited mental capacity. Justice Brennan dis-
sented from the Court's opinion in Penry v. Lynaugh, 2 which
held that it is not unconstitutional to execute mentally retarded
people. Justice Brennan noted that while not all mentally re-
tarded people are mentally handicapped to the same degree,
there are certain "characteristics as to which there is no danger
of spurious generalization because they are part of the clinical
definition of mental retardation."'43 These traits include low in-
telligence, meaning an IQ below 70, and also being "subject to
'significant limitations in meeting the standards of maturation,
learning, personal independence, and/or social responsibility
that are expected for those of the same age level and cultural
group.' "4
Justice Brennan concluded that "[t]he impairment of a
mentally retarded offender's reasoning ability, control over im-
pulsive behavior, and moral development in my view limits her
culpability so that whatever other punishment might be appro-
priate, the ultimate penalty of death is always and necessarily
disproportionate to their blameworthiness, and hence is
39. Id.
40. Id. at 394.
41. Id. at 403.
42. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
43. Id. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (quoting AAMR, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 11-12 (H. Gross-
man ed. 1983)).
[Vol. 11:473
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unconstitutional. '45
Although several states have abolished the use of capital
punishment for the mentally retarded, most states have not.
Justice Brennan was in the majority on the issue of the use
of victim impact statements in trying to secure a death verdict.
Writing for the Court in South Carolina v. Gathers," Justice
Brennan held that it was unconstitutional for the prosecutor to
suggest that the defendant get the death penalty because the
victim was a religious man and a registered voter, when the de-
fendant had no knowledge of these facts.47 Under such circum-
stances, the victim's admirable qualities "cannot provide any in-
formation relevant to the defendant's moral culpability."' 8
However, soon after Justice Brennan left the Court, it over-
ruled Gathers. It did so in 1991, in Payne v. Tennessee.'9
In California v. Brown,50 the Supreme Court upheld as con-
stitutional the judge's instruction in the penalty phase of a capi-
tal case that the jurors "must not be swayed by mere sentiment,
conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or pub-
lic feeling."'" The Court rejected the death row inmate's conten-
tion that the charge was unconstitutional because (a) sympathy
was what the defense was trying to evoke through a great deal of
mitigating evidence concerning the defendant's background and
(b) the Court has consistently held that a capital defendant is
allowed to introduce in mitigation anything about his back-
ground that might cause the jury to give him a sentence less
than death." In his dissent, Justice Brennan wrote that the lan-
guage in the charge to the jury "precludes precisely the response
that a defendant's evidence of character and background is
designed to elicit, thus effectively negating the Court's require-
ment that all mitigating evidence be considered." 53 He went on
to point out that the vast majority of jurors are rational - not,
45. Id. at 346.
46. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
47. Id. at 810.
48. Id. at 812.
49. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
50. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
51. Id. at 539.
52. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978).
53. California, 479 U.S. at 548 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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as the majority seemed to think, "telepathic." Thus, the "vast
majority of jurors" likely would interpret the word "'sympathy'
to mean 'sympathy,'" and not what the majority said jurors
would somehow interpret it to mean: "untethered sympathy,"
i.e., sympathy that has no relationship to any of the evidence
presented at trial.'
Appellate court review of death sentences should be, but
generally is not, an occasion for dealing with the arbitrariness
and capriciousness in capital sentencing. When the Supreme
Court upheld the Georgia death sentence scheme in Gregg v.
Georgia,55 the key opinion pointed to "meaningful appellate re-
view" as a "safeguard... to ensure that death sentences are not
imposed capriciously or in a freakish manner,"56 and stressed
that the Georgia Supreme Court would compare "each death
sentence with the sentences imposed on similarly situated de-
fendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particular
case is not disproportionate. 5 7 Unfortunately, the Georgia Su-
preme Court has not done that,58 nor have the courts of most
states.
Just eight years after the opinion in Gregg stressed how im-
portant proportionality review was, the Supreme Court held in
Pulley v. Harris59 that a state does not have to have proportion-
ality review. Thus, a state Supreme Court does not have to look
at whether people in similar cases, or even those whose crimes
were much worse than the defendant's, received the death pen-
alty or not. Nor need they look at whether the co-defendant in
the same case - who may have killed the victim while the un-
knowing defendant was in the getaway car - also received the
death penalty.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Pulley said that "the Court is
simply deluding itself, and also the American public, when it in-
sists that those defendants who have already been executed or
are today condemned to death have been selected on a basis that
54. See id. at 548-51.
55. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
56. Id. at 195 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
57. Id. at 198.
58. See Tabak and Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-Benefit
Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 LOYOLA OF L.A. L. Rzv. 59, 82 (1989).
59. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
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is neither arbitrary nor capricious, under any meaningful defini-
tion of those terms." He added that "[clomparative review of
death sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants might
eliminate some, if only a small part, of the irrationality that cur-
rently surrounds the imposition of the death penalty. '60 How-
ever, in the wake of Pulley, such review almost never takes
place.
In his Pulley dissent, Justice Brennan focused on the sub-
ject of racial discrimination in the imposition of the death pen-
alty. He argued that an examination of racial factors in death
penalty cases could not be put off much longer, and that the
Court had better deal with it soon."1 It did so in the following
year, in McCleskey v. Kemp."' The Court said in McCleskey
that for purposes of analysis, it would assume that, as demon-
strated by the study introduced by McCleskey, a defendant was
many times more likely to get the death penalty if he killed a
white person than if he killed a black person, even if everything
else about the case was the same." But the Court held that this
did not violate the Constitution.6 4 It said that this was some-
thing for legislative bodies to deal with. 5
In dissent, Justice Brennan wrote:
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubtless asked
his lawyer whether a jury was likely to sentence him to die. A
candid reply to this question would have been disturbing. First,
counsel would have had to tell McCleskey that few of the details
of the crime or of McCleskey's past criminal conduct were more
important than the fact that the victim was white .... Further-
more, counsel would feel bound to tell McCleskey that defendants
charged with killing white victims in Georgia are [after consider-
ing 200 variables] 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced to death as
defendants charged with killing blacks. .... 66 In addition, frank-
ness would have compelled the disclosure that it was more likely
than not that the race of McCleskey's victim would determine
60. Id. at 60-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 64-67.
62. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
63. See id. at 292.
64. Id. at 307.
65. Id. at 319.
66. 4.3 times is a higher multiplier than in statistics about smoking causing cancer.
See id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1991]
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whether he received a death sentence .... 67
III. The Execution of People Who Were Convicted or
Sentenced in Serious Violation of The Bill of Rights - Due
to Procedural Barriers Erected by the Supreme Court
Justice Brennan dissented in a series of cases through which
the Supreme Court has made it impossible for many death row
inmates to get a ruling on the merits of their claims that they
were convicted or sentenced to death in serious violation of the
Bill of Rights. As a result of these Supreme Court decisions, a
growing number of people are being executed even though the
Bill of Rights was violated in such egregious respects as to have
likely affected the outcome of their trials. In these cases, death
row inmates would have gotten relief if the federal courts had
simply considered the merits of their meritorious claims.
Through three different doctrines, the supposedly conserva-
tive, non-activist majority of the Supreme Court has been engag-
ing in judicial legislation which is eviscerating the right to get a
federal court to rule on such claims.
One of these doctrines is procedural default. The first case
in the judicial enactment of procedural bars was Wainwright v.
Sykes.a8 The Sykes Court partially overruled the test enunciated
by Justice Brennan for the Court in Fay v. Noia.6 9 Under Fay a
federal court would consider a prisoner's constitutional claim
unless the prisoner's lawyer, as a result of a deliberate strategy,
decided not to raise the claim in state court in an attempt to
bypass the state court and get to federal court. Except where
such a strategy was followed, the prisoner's claim would be con-
sidered by a federal court, even if the state courts had not con-
sidered it.
In Sykes the Court held that a prisoner who failed to raise a
claim in all state court proceedings in which raising the claim
was mandated by state procedure could not then secure any rul-
ing on the merits of that claim from a federal court unless he
could show: (a) cause "for why he didn't raise the claim in state
67. Id. Mr. McCleskey was executed on September 25, 1991.
68. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
69. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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court" and (b) "actual prejudice" 7 0- and it defined "cause" and
"actual prejudice" in very limiting ways. 1
Justice Brennan's dissent in Sykes proved prescient about
where the Court was headed. He warned that if the standard
adopted in Sykes was "later construed," as it has been in such
cases as Murray v. Carrier, and Dugger v. Adams, "to require
that the simple mistakes of attorneys are to be treated as bind-
ing forfeitures, it would serve to subordinate the fundamental
rights contained in our constitutional charter to inadvertent de-
faults of rules promulgated by state agencies and would essen-
tially leave it to the states through the enactment of procedures
and the certification of the competence of local attorneys to de-
termine whether a habeas applicant will be permitted the access
to the federal forum that is guaranteed him by Congress. "72
That, in fact, is what has happened, most recently in Cole-
man v. Thompson, 3 in which the Court overruled Fay in its one
remaining context - where a lawyer's incompetence results in
a prisoner's complete failure to file any timely appeal. In Cole-
man, counsel's obviously "inadvertent error" to file the state
post-conviction brief on time rather than three days late was
held to completely preclude federal court review of all of the
death row inmate's constitutional claims.7 '
As Justice Brennan warned in his Sykes dissent, the conse-
quence of the Court's procedural default doctrine is that the
State's alleged constitutional violations (or, in some cases, what
we know for sure to be the State's actual constitutional viola-
tions) which are not harmless error are insulated "from any and
all judicial review" in both state and federal courts, simply "be-
cause of a lawyer's mistake. 7 5
Yet, as Justice Brennan stated, if either the defendant or
the State is to be held responsible for an appointed defense
counsel's error of not objecting, it should be the State, because
the State controls the "admissions and certification policy" for
attorneys and the appointments of attorneys for indigent people.
70. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 107 (footnote omitted).
73. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
74. Id. at 2564, 2568.
75. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 108 (1977).
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Hence, the State "is more fairly held to blame for the fact that
practicing lawyers too often are ill-prepared or ill-equipped to
act carefully and knowledgeably when faced with decisions gov-
erned by state procedural requirements. ' '7 6 Justice Brennan
added that if habeas corpus jurisdiction were to be severely lim-
ited by a procedural default doctrine, the courts "will have to
reconsider whether to continue to indulge the comfortable fic-
tion that all lawyers are skilled or even competent craftsmen in
representing the fundamental rights of their clients."' 7
A second doctrine by which the merits of a case are ignored
is abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. It concerns inter alia, situ-
ations in which prisoners: (a) raise certain claims in federal
court, (b) subsequently discover that the State lied to or severely
mislead them or their lawyers about other constitutional claims
and (c) submit a second habeas corpus petition in the federal
courts in order to raise the additional claims.
Subsequent to Justice Brennan's departure from the Court,
it held in McCleskey v. Zant78 that the Sykes "cause" and "ac-
tual prejudice" test would now also apply to the question of
whether a second or subsequent federal habeas corpus petition
constitutes an abuse of the writ and should therefore be dis-
missed - regardless of the seriousness of the State's violation
of the Bill of Rights. The Court enunciated and applied the
"cause" and "actual prejudice" test so narrowly in McCleskey
that it seems clear that almost no one will be able to get a ruling
on the merits of a successor habeas claim.
Although this decision was handed down after he had left
the Court, Justice Brennan's opinions leave little doubt that he
would vigorously disagree with the McCleskey holding. This is
apparent from his dissenting opinion in Kuhlmann v. Wilson 7 9
which concerned a petitioner who attempted to present the same
claim for a second time in a subsequent federal habeas corpus
petition. In that dissent, Justice Brennan rejected the idea of
balancing "the interests of the State and the prisoner" 80 in order
76. Id. at 114.
77. Id. at 118.
78. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
79. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
80. Id. at 467 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 11:473
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to determine whether an unconstitutionally convicted or death-
sentenced prisoner may secure relief from the federal courts.
Justice Brennan stated that the only circumstance under which
a second or subsequent habeas petition could be dismissed as an
abuse of the writ was if the petition is "vexatious and merit-
less."81 Justice Brennan would surely have opposed any effort to
judicially legislate any more stringent standard with respect to
claims being raised in federal court for the first time. Yet, that is
what the Court has now done in McCleskey.
A third aspect of the Court's effort to eviscerate habeas
corpus began with Teague v. Lane,82 and reached a climax with
Butler v. McKellar.83 Under the judicial legislation in these
holdings, the following type of situation can now occur. A de-
fendant raises at and before trial, on appeal and in the certiorari
petition every conceivable constitutional claim, waiving nothing
(under any waiver test); but the appeal is unsuccessful and cer-
tiorari is denied. One of the defendant's claims seeks a holding
which would constitute only a modest extension of existing Su-
preme Court holdings. Before the defendant's case gets into fed-
eral court, the Supreme Court rules - in a legal and factual
context indistinguishable from the defendant's case - that the
conviction or death sentence is unconstitutional and not harm-
less error, and states that this holding is governed by Supreme
Court decisions which had been handed down before the direct
appeal in the defendant's case was completed. Defendant's meri-
torious constitutional claim will nevertheless be dismissed by the
federal courts, because the Supreme Court holding which is di-
rectly on point was decided after his direct appeal was com-
pleted and because the prior Supreme Court decisions - while
close enough analytically to have governed the Supreme Court's
on-point holding - were not directly right on-point with his
case.
That is essentially what happened in Butler v. McKellar.
Mr. Butler attempted to present a constitutional claim based on
the Supreme Court's holding in Edwards v. Arizona84 which had
81. Id. at 469.
82. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
83. 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
84. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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been handed down before Butler's direct appeal was decided. In
Edwards, the Court held that if a suspect is in custody and the
police begin questioning him about a crime and the suspect
states at some point that he does not want to be questioned fur-
ther in the absence of an attorney, the police cannot question
him further. Mr. Butler was questioned further, but the addi-
tional questions were about a different crime than the one about
which he had previously been questioned. Mr. Butler contended,
throughout all proceedings in his case, that the additional ques-
tioning was unconstitutional. Before Mr. Butler's case got into
federal court, but after his direct appeal was completed, the
Court ruled in Arizona v. Roberson"5 that the police cannot
question an accused about a different crime after he has invoked
his right to counsel. In so holding the Court said that its deci-
sion in Roberson was "directly controlled" by Edwards."'
Mr. Butler's claim was, like Mr. Roberson's, an obvious ex-
tension of Edwards. But the Supreme Court held in 1990 that
Butler could not get relief, because (a) Roberson was a "new
rule" handed down after Butler's direct appeal had been com-
pleted and (b) Edwards did not dictate a ruling in Butler's favor
because, prior to Roberson, "reasonable minds" had debated
whether Edwards applied to the facts of such cases as Rober-
son's and Butler's. 7 Hence, even though his claim was a simple
extension of a pre-existing Supreme Court holding and was iden-
tical to a Supreme Court holding handed down before he first
petitioned the federal courts, Butler was not allowed to benefit
from the Edwards decision.
Justice Brennan's vigorous dissent in Butler stated that:
Today, under the guise of fine-tuning the definition of 'new rule,'
the Court strips state prisoners of virtually any meaningful fed-
eral review of the constitutionality of their incarceration. ... [A]
state prisoner can secure habeas relief only by showing that the
state court's rejection of the constitutional challenge was so
clearly invalid under then prevailing legal standards that the de-
cision could not be defended by any reasonable jurist. With this
requirement, the Court has finally succeeded in its thinly veiled
85. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
86. Id. at 682.
87. Butler, 494 U.S. at 415.
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crusade to eviscerate Congress' habeas corpus regime. 88
IV. The Death Penalty Only Creates More Victims
I will conclude by discussing the other part of Justice Bren-
nan's eighth amendment jurisprudence which he articulated in
Furman. Justice Brennan said that "[a]t bottom," the eighth
amendment "prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman
punishments." '89 The eighth amendment requires that "[tihe
state, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect
for their intrinsic worth as human beings."90
Justice Brennan concluded that this fundamental principle
applies to punishment for even the most brutal crimes. "The
true significance," he said, of history's condemnation of such
punishments "as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the
stretching of limbs" is that those practices treated "members of
the human race as non-humans, as objects to be toyed with and
discarded. They are thus inconsistent with the fundamental pre-
mise of the [eighth amendment] that even the vilest criminal re-
mains a human being possessed of common human dignity."91
Justice Brennan stressed that "the calculated killing of a
human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial
of the executed person's humanity. 9 2 This fundamental aspect
of capital punishment - when combined with (a) the arbitrary
application of the death penalty, (b) the "grave societal doubts"
about it (as reflected, inter alia, in the infrequency of its use)
and (c) the likelihood that it "cannot be shown to be serving any
penal purpose that could not be served equally well by some less
severe punishment," 93 led Justice Brennan to conclude that the
death penalty violates the eighth amendment.
I have long understood the other aspects of Justice Bren-
nan's capital punishment jurisprudence, but I only recently have
appreciated the validity of his most basic principle: that "death
88. Id. at 120 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original).
89. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 237-38 (quoting O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J.,
dissenting)).
92. Id. at 290.
93. Id. at 300.
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stands condemned as fatally offensive to human dignity. 94
I came to appreciate this only when - after many years of
representing death row inmates, including two before the Su-
preme Court - I decided to really get to know some of my cli-
ents personally. The time which I have spent with these death
row inmates has given me a deeper understanding of what Jus-
tice Brennan recognized implicitly: that death row inmates - no
matter what heinous crimes they have committed - are human
beings, and our society's decision on whether to treat these in-
mates with human dignity is a crucial test of our civilization. I
now realize that Justice Brennan was correct in concluding that
the death penalty should not be applied to anyone because
"Death, quite simply, does not . . . comport[ I with human
dignity." 95
The death penalty is being used as a sanction in this coun-
try because too many people consider only the terrible thing
that has happened in the past - the horrible murder which has
been committed usually (but not always) by the person who is
convicted. When viewed in this light, the death penalty is
deemed justifiable, because a terrible, horrendous crime has
been committed; a wonderful life has been snuffed out; and the
person responsible should be punished and should not be al-
lowed to commit any further murders. Yet, there is another pos-
sible perspective, which recognizes what has occurred in the past
but which focuses on what best to do in the future in light of the
situation we face now. From this frame of reference, we can rec-
ognize that even if the convicted person really committed the
murder and is not (as many death row inmates are) mentally
retarded or severally mentally ill, he remains a human being;
that application of the death penalty will only create more vic-
tims; and that it will neither bring the victim back to life nor
prevent others from being murder victims.
If we consider the issue with the latter, more complete per-
spective, we can begin to grapple with a crucial question which
capital punishment enables many of our politicians to avoid:
What should we do with respect to human beings who are now
alive: both the human beings who may be future victims of mur-
94. Id. at 305.
95. Id. at 305.
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der and the human beings who have been found guilty of mur-
der? I submit that if we evaluate the death penalty against the
alternative of "long-term imprisonment, which may well be for
the rest of [a criminal's] life," 96 we would recognize that by im-
plementing capital punishment society (a) kills innocent people,
(b) continues to have the same - or even higher - murder
rate, (c) commits racial discrimination in executing people, (d)
spends more money in dealing with murderers, than if there
were no death penalty, (e) fails to deal with, and may aggravate,
the situations of survivors of murder victims, and (f) places this
country at odds with virtually all other democratic countries.9 7
However, all too few people consider the issue from that
type of perspective. Instead, they listen to politicians who say
that they are for the death penalty and therefore must be
against crime; or to death penalty opponents who say that the
death penalty is so clearly immoral that they will not discuss its
purported practical benefits.
Yet, public opinion surveys have repeatedly shown that the
public would be responsive to a reasoned discussion of the death
penalty and real-life alternatives to the death penalty. These
polls indicate that the majority of the public favors some version
of life without parole over the death penalty.98 Unfortunately,
most people do not know that in most states, a life sentence for
capital murder (the only type of murder for which the death
sentence is possible) is a life sentence with no chance of parole
for 20, 25, 30 or more years or even - in many
states - forever. 9 Jurors ask about this frequently in death
penalty trials and, after judges refuse to tell them what a life
sentence really would mean - usually vote for the death sen-
tence. 100 It is equally tragic that the public is unaware of the
real-life evidence - from those saved from death by Furman
and subsequent cases, that there are effective ways of preventing
further killings by convicted capital murderers. 10 1
Meanwhile, our society continues to execute even (a) people
96. Id. at 301.
97. See generally Tabak and Lane, supra note 58.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 126-27.
100. Id. at 78-80.
101. Id. at 123-24.
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who have developed evidence sufficient to generate serious
doubts about their guilt,102 (b) a man who saved numerous
prison guards during a prison riot,0 3 (c) a man who was sup-
ported for clemency by the father of the victim and the trial
prosecutor,0 and (d) a 17 year-old semi-retarded black youth
with partial brain damage, who was convicted and sentenced to
die by an all-white jury and whose pardon board recommended
clemency. 10 5
In view of all this, I agree - subject to one modification
indicated in brackets - with the conclusion to Justice Bren-
nan's Oliver Holmes Lecture in 1986: "I believe that a majority
of the Supreme Court [or a majority of society] will one day ac-
cept that when the state punishes with death, it denies the hu-
manity and dignity of the victim and transgresses the prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment. That day will be a
great day for our country, and also for our Constitution. ' 10 6
102. Id. at 112-13.
103. See Evans v. Muncy, 111 S. Ct. 309, 310 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. See Tabak and Lane, supra note 58, at 130-31.
105. See Shapiro, A Life in His Hands, TimE (May 28, 1990).
106. See Brennan, supra note 10, at 331.
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